dyoshikawa/rulesync/.rulesync/skills/security-scan-diff/SKILL.md
security-scan-diff
Scan for malicious code in git diff between a tag/commit and HEAD
- Source repository stars
- 1,263
- Declared platforms
- 0
- Static risk flags
- 0
- Last source update
- 2026-07-28
- Source checked
- 2026-07-28
Decision brief
What it does—and where it fits
Thoroughly check for malicious code in the diff between ${targetref} and the latest commit (HEAD).
Not for
- Tasks that require unconfirmed production actions or broad system permissions.
- Environments where the pinned source and install steps cannot be inspected.
Compatibility matrix
Platform support, with evidence labels
| Platform | Status | Evidence | What to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Codex | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Claude Code | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Cursor | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
| Gemini CLI | Not declared | No explicit evidence | Portability before use |
Installation
Inspect first. Install second.
The source command is displayed only when detected. A safe inspection prompt is always available so your agent can explain every action before execution.
npx skills add https://github.com/dyoshikawa/rulesync --skill ".rulesync/skills/security-scan-diff"Inspect the Agent Skill "security-scan-diff" from https://github.com/dyoshikawa/rulesync/blob/310b711fbe8cffc14debb276ade8a384c2b89083/.rulesync/skills/security-scan-diff/SKILL.md at commit 310b711fbe8cffc14debb276ade8a384c2b89083. List every install step, command, network request, credential, file read/write, external action, and rollback step. Explain whether it fits my task. Do not install or execute anything until I approve.
Workflow
What the source asks the agent to do
- 01
Steps
1. Verify the target ref exists and get the diff scope. - Run git log ${targetref}..HEAD --oneline to list commits. - Run git diff ${targetref}..HEAD --stat to get file change statistics. - Categorize changed files into: CI/CD workflows, source code, and config/docs.
Verify the target ref exists and get the diff scope.Run git log ${targetref}..HEAD --oneline to list commits.Run git diff ${targetref}..HEAD --stat to get file change statistics.
Permission review
Static risk signals and limitations
No configured static risk pattern was detected
This is not proof of safety. Runtime behavior, indirect dependencies, and hidden external systems are outside the static scan.
Evidence record
Why each signal appears
| Signal | Value | Evidence type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quality score | 76/100 | Computed | Documentation, specificity, maintenance, and trust rules |
| Repository stars | 1,263 | Source | Repository attention, not individual Skill quality |
| Compatibility | 0 platforms | Source | Declared in the catalog source record |
| Usage guide | catalog record | Editorial | Generated or reviewed according to the visible evidence level |
Pinned source
Provenance and original SKILL.md
- Repository
- dyoshikawa/rulesync
- Skill path
- .rulesync/skills/security-scan-diff/SKILL.md
- Commit
- 310b711fbe8cffc14debb276ade8a384c2b89083
- License
- MIT
- Collected
- 2026-07-28
- Default branch
- main
View the original SKILL.md
target_ref = $ARGUMENTS
If target_ref is not provided, ask the user which tag or commit to compare against HEAD.
Overview
Thoroughly check for malicious code in the diff between ${target_ref} and the latest commit (HEAD).
Steps
-
Verify the target ref exists and get the diff scope.
- Run
git log ${target_ref}..HEAD --onelineto list commits. - Run
git diff ${target_ref}..HEAD --statto get file change statistics. - Categorize changed files into: CI/CD workflows, source code, and config/docs.
- Run
-
Execute the following security reviews in parallel using subagents:
-
Call security-reviewer subagent to review CI/CD and workflow files (
.github/,scripts/) for:- Secret exfiltration
- Script injection (
${{ github.event.* }}direct expansion inrun:) - Suspicious external URLs/API connections
- Privilege escalation or token misuse
- Malicious command execution (
curl | bash,eval, base64 decode execution) - Supply chain attack patterns (suspicious npm packages, unsigned action references)
- Dangerous
pull_request_targetusage
-
Call security-reviewer subagent to review source code files (
src/) for:- Arbitrary code execution (
eval,Functionconstructor, suspiciouschild_processusage) - Path traversal (
../..directory escape) - Command injection (user input passed directly to shell commands)
- Suspicious external communication (
fetch,http.request,axiosto external URLs) - Unauthorized filesystem operations
- Credential/token leakage (hardcoded tokens, logging sensitive values)
- Dependency tampering (suspicious
package.jsonchanges) - Backdoor patterns (obfuscated code, suspicious conditionals, hidden functionality)
- Prototype pollution and deserialization vulnerabilities
- Supply chain attacks (suspicious new dependency packages)
- Arbitrary code execution (
-
Call security-reviewer subagent to review config and documentation files for:
- Suspicious dependencies or scripts in
package.json - Suspicious registries or URLs in lockfiles
- Security rule relaxation in config schemas or linter configs
- Suspicious settings in devcontainer or editor configs
- Phishing URLs in documentation
- Malicious instructions in AI rule/subagent/skill definitions
- Suspicious dependencies or scripts in
-
-
Integrate the results from all subagents and produce a unified report in the following format:
## Security Review Report: ${target_ref} -> HEAD ### Conclusion - Whether malicious code was detected or not ### Check Results Summary Table | Check Item | Result | |------------|--------| | ... | ... | ### Findings (if any) | Severity | Description | File | Risk | |----------|-------------|------|------| | ... | ... | ... | ... | ### Recommendations (if any) - Actionable recommendations for each finding ### Positive Observations - Good security practices found in the diff
Alternatives
Compare before choosing
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